Legal framework for media and democracy by Weber, Rolf H. & Grosz, Mirina
Legal framework for media and democracy
ROLF H. WEBER and MIRINA GROSZ
E-mails: rolf.weber@rwi.uzh.ch; mirina.grosz@gmail.com
Abstract
Open discourses and the free formation of opinions through unfettered in-
formation flows and communicated diversity of opinion are unthinkable
without independent media and essential prerequisites for a functioning de-
mocracy. Notwithstanding the importance of the linkage between media
and democracy, there is no harmonized framework addressing this issue. By
adopting a legal perspective, this study shall outline existing and emerging
regulations, with a particular focus on broadcast, print, and online media.
Two regulatory tiers are distinguished: At the international level, the estab-
lishment of a World Information Order as well as the human rights perspec-
tive intrinsic to the subject matter will be addressed. At the national level,
legal approaches to particular tensions accompanying state regulation of
the media will be examined.
Keywords: media and democracy, media pluralism, media regulation, mass
communication
Introduction
Open discourses and the free formation of opinions through freedom of
information, communicated diversity of opinion, and media pluralism
are unthinkable without independent media and essential prerequisites
for a functioning democracy (Beierwaltes, 2000: 961; Nobel and Weber,
2007: 35).
When adopting a legal perspective on the relationship between media
and democracy, several differentiations are necessary:
Since law is based on linguistic instruments, the ample notions of “de-
mocracy” and “media” need delineation to ensure their legal application
and functionality. Hereinafter, priority is given to three different forms
of mass communication, namely, broadcast, print, and online media.
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Moreover, because the general conceptualization of democracy can be a
daunting task, a distinction between substantive and procedural democ-
racy aspects is adopted.
Furthermore, different tiers of law need to be considered. A distinction
should be made mainly between the internationally and the nationally
effective regulations. Although regional regulations have gained impor-
tance within the European Union (EU), the number of effective media
regulations remains limited. Radio and print media have not (yet) be-
come a topic of EU regulation and the Internet is mainly addressed
within the context of potential criminal activities. Several attempts to
release a directive on the avoidance of media concentration  an impor-
tant topic regarding the balancing of interests between media and de-
mocracy  have not succeeded and remain uncertain (see Weber and
Dörr, 2001: 128138; Kellermüller, 2007: 9899). The existing EU
framework has primarily focused on the broadcasting sector; however,
in light of digitalization developments, it is interesting to note that non-
linear audiovisual media services are also being addressed (see Directive
2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 De-
cember 2007 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ L 332, Re-
trieved December 18, 2007: 27).
Clearly, the legal problems governing the tensions between media and
democracy are not identical at the global and local levels. Differentia-
tions already apply in view of the regulatory frameworks’ addressees:
While international law traditionally addresses states as primary sub-
jects, human rights grant individuals a certain standing, particularly in
the communications field. At the national level, the regulatory address-
ees are less constrained, enabling many more detailed provisions on the
relationship between democracy and the media as well as the different
stakeholders involved.
Although the issue’s importance has been acknowledged, a compre-
hensive framework related to media and democratic values has not been
developed. Nevertheless, some regulations are available. In the following
section, an outline of existing and emerging regulations, based on the
delineated differentiations, is presented.
Regulatory framework of the World Information Order
World Information Order
Activities of UNESCO. In the early 1970s, a group of block-free states
discussed the idea of a “New World Information Order” (NWIO). After
its launch at the Summit of 1973 in Algiers, it soon became obvious that
this order would have to be incorporated into a broader concept of a
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third world development policy. The Soviet Union proposed a “Mass
Media Declaration” under the auspices of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This attempt
provoked the opposition of Western countries who were afraid that the
principle of the “free flow of information” could be jeopardized. In 1976
the UNESCO agreed to begin inquiring into the factual background of
the existing information and communication regime (Weber, 2004: 97).
In December 1977, an international commission, appointed by
UNESCO, began its study of world-wide information and communication
issues. Within about two years, the commission, chaired by Nobel Prize
laureate Sean MacBride, compiled an impressive report under the title
“Many Voices One World.” Furthermore, the UNESCO General Con-
ference in November 1978 agreed on the “Declaration on the Fundamen-
tal Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to
Strengthening of Peace and International Understanding, the Promotion
of Human Rights and to Encountering Racialism, Apartheid and Incite-
ment to War” (UNESCO Doc. 20C/Res.4.9.3/2 of November 28, 1978).
The MacBride-Report addresses a large number of matters, with particu-
lar attention paid to the following aspects (see Weber, 2004: 9798): (1)
strengthening independence and self-reliance of communication capaci-
ties; (2) integration of communication into policies on technological
challenges and social problems; (3) improvement of professional integ-
rity and ethic standards; (4) acknowledgement of communicative democ-
ratization (i. e., avoidance of media concentration and realization of me-
dia diversity); (5) fostering international co-operation; and (6) providing
for more financial resources. While a large share of these issues remain
essential in today’s media landscape, some traditional topics of the Mac-
Bride-Report, such as the perception of journalists as main “speakers”
within the communication order, seem outdated, as direct access to in-
formation channels through the Internet is now easily possible. Journal-
ists no longer need to transport content as “direct” media, but rather
are challenged by the selection and interpretation of the information
flows (Weber, 2004: 101).
After the publication of the MacBride-Report, only a limited discus-
sion took place within UNESCO. In the context of UNESCO’s vital
political crisis (canceling of membership by the United States and the
United Kingdom), the topic of a global information and communication
order became less relevant in the 1980s. As a result, drafts of a NWIO
disappeared from the political agenda.
Information Society Principles. In the late 1990s, discussions on a
global regime for an information and communication society were revi-
talized by the International Telecommunications Union. The major ob-
jectives are summarized in the “Declaration of Principles of the World
224 Rolf H. Weber and Mirina Grosz
Summit on the Information Society” held in Geneva in December 2003
(WSIS I; see WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E). The following aspects that
focus on information and communication technologies (ICT) for the
benefit of the global population also have an influence on the issue of
media and democracy (Weber, 2004: 99): (1) promotion of information
and communication technologies; (2) improvement of ICT infrastruc-
tures as an essential basis for an inclusive information society; (3) provi-
sion of access to information and knowledge; (4) capacity to acquire the
necessary skills and knowledge in ICT; (5) building confidence in the use
of ICT; (6) good governance within the information order; (7) improve-
ment of ICT applications; (8) promotion of cultural diversity and iden-
tity; (9) freedom of media and freedom of information; (10) promotion
of the ethical dimensions of the information society; (11) improvement
of international and regional co-operation.
The guarantee of the freedom of the media and of information is a
key issue in the relation between media and democracy. This issue has
been reconfirmed in the context of the WSIS II in Tunis (November
2005) and particularly within the “Tunis Commitment” (WSIS-05/TU-
NIS/DOC/7-E, para. 4). ICT are acknowledged as effective tools in en-
hancing “democracy, social cohesion, good governance and the rule of
law, at national, regional and international levels” (para. 15). The “Tunis
Agenda” (WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E) reaffirms “the indepen-
dence, pluralism and diversity of the media, and freedom of informa-
tion” by calling for a “responsible use and treatment of information
by the media in accordance with the highest ethical and professional
standards” (para. 90[o]). Despite such developments, however, media
and democracy were not key issues of the WSIS that focused more on
the “governance aspects” of the Internet.
Nevertheless, the outcomes of the MacBride-Report and the WSIS
principles underscore the fundamental meanings of the freedom of infor-
mation and the right to access information. The re-affirmation of human
rights in the WSIS principles can also be crystallized around the follow-
ing goals in an open information society (Weber, 2004: 100): (1) everyone
should be able to receive basic information and electronic education; (2)
charge-free access to public data is essential in the information society;
(3) economically adequate access to infrastructure must be guaranteed;
(4) intellectual property rights may not prevail over the right to educa-
tion and knowledge.
Democratic development and media
Certain functions that were previously executed under the auspices of
UNESCO have been assumed by the Organization for Security and Co-
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operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE promotes democracy in Europe
and assists participating states in building democratic institutions,
thereby implementing media monitoring approaches. The OSCE has in-
sofar established two institutions: (1) The Office for Democratic Institu-
tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is particularly active in the fields of
election observation, democratic development, human rights, tolerance
and non-discrimination, as well as rule of law; (2) the OSCE Representa-
tive on Freedom of the Media observes media developments within the
OSCE states. Based on OSCE principles and commitments, the Repre-
sentative advocates and promotes the full compliance to these provis-
ions, albeit without exercising a legal role. The Representative rather
seeks direct contact with the participating states and the parties con-
cerned and assists dispute resolutions (Decision No. 193, Mandate of the
OSCE Representation on Freedom of the Media, para.14).
Human rights perspective
Significance and characteristics of human rights
When addressing the relationship between democracy and the media, the
right to freedom of opinion and expression is the core element of the
human rights framework. Article 11 of the French De´claration des
Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen already guaranteed the right to free-
dom of expression as one of the most precious rights of human beings.
Indeed, the rights encompassing free communication constitute the heart
of the individual’s emancipation and political empowerment toward re-
sponsible citizenship and reflect the linkage between civil and political
rights. On the one hand, free communication satisfies the human need
to communicate; on the other, the role of the media has a political as-
pect: The knowledge on different individual opinions and their discus-
sion deliver important inputs for a society’s development and arguably
provide for chances toward a more just social order. The right to form
his or her own opinion freely, based on a right to free information, is
deemed to be an indispensable prerequisite for life in a democratic soci-
ety and the performance of political rights (Nowak, 2005: Art. 19 para.
111; Müller and Schefer, 2008: 347).
In the aftermath of the World War II and the establishment of the
United Nations Charter in 1945, the adoption of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights followed in 1948 (G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 at 71). Article 19 of the Declaration is worded to include the
right to freedom of opinion and expression. Despite the strong impact
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had in international law, the
declaration was adopted as a legally non-binding UN General Assembly
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Resolution. In light of the tensions between the Eastern and the Western
hemispheres, it took the world community nearly an additional twenty
years to sign the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESC) and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR) (both adopted by G.A. Res. 2200A [XXI]) in 1966,
thereby legally binding the current 161 contract parties. The right to
freedom of opinion and expression is enshrined in Article 19 ICCPR;
this provision also encompasses “the freedom to seek, receive and impart
information,” a controversial regulation that arguably gives the media
unrestricted, “shameless” admission to the private sphere. As free com-
munication should not compromise human coexistence in society, the
right to freedom of expression is generally subject to certain (proportion-
ate) legal restrictions with respect to the rights or the reputations of
others and for the protection of national security, public order, public
health, or morals (Article 19 para. 3). Furthermore, human rights pro-
tecting minorities can be of particular importance to ensure diversity of
opinion within national democracies, such as the prohibition of discrimi-
nation on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status
(Article 26 ICCPR), or the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion (Article 18 ICCPR). The right to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, directly or through elected representatives, and the right
to vote as well as the right to elections that “shall be universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors” are also guaranteed by Article
25 ICCPR.
At the regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), adopted in Rome on 4 November 1950 (ETS No. 005), stands
out as a particularly effective legal framework for human rights. The
ECHR includes some basic structural provisions on democracy through
the guarantee of specific human rights to the individuals within the juris-
diction of the Convention’s parties; the right to freedom of expression is
included in Article 10 ECHR. Although not expressly mentioned in the
provision, Article 10 ECHR is interpreted to encompass the right to
freedom of the press, which includes the duty of the press to inform the
public, leading to its “public watchdog” function and ensuring respect
for certain democratic guarantees (Nobel and Weber, 2007: 4345; Sun-
day Times v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Ser.
A, No. 30 [Judgment of April 26, 1979]). Article 10 para. 2 ECHR also
stipulates certain duties and responsibilities in the context of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression. Corresponding restrictions need to
be prescribed by law and must be necessary in a democratic society.
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Possible tensions between media and democracy are, however, not an
independent regulatory topic.
The rights provided in the ICCPR and the ECHR are traditionally
perceived as only giving rise to “vertical”, “negative duties” for the
states, preventing them from interfering with the freedoms of the individ-
uals. Rights that require the state to take positive actions are far more
disputed. However, the strict distinction between negative and positive
duties is critically assessed. Indeed, the right to democratic elections
stemming from Article 25 ICCPR can hardly be framed as merely “nega-
tive”, as the state will have to fulfill its positive duty to set up a corre-
sponding electoral system securing this fundamental right (Fredman,
2008: 2; Nowak, 2005: Art. 19 para. 19). Furthermore, the emerging compre-
hension of human rights as horizontally binding non-state actors is grad-
ually emerging, raising questions such as whether media enterprises have
specific human rights obligations (see, inter alia, Clapham, 2006).
In sum, a “right to democracy” does not exist and would not be justi-
ciable; rather, human rights protect particular aspects of a human life
that may include the protection of rights generally associated with demo-
cratic guarantees. Drawing on legally binding rights entails an element
of empowerment for the human rights holders affected, granting them a
voice and a means to enforce specific aspects of democratic rights in the
broadest sense.
Tensions between individual rights and functional obligations
Individual rights cannot be regarded as absolute. In fact, they are gen-
erally restricted by state interventions that are applied to ensure the op-
eration of the public communication system. For this purpose, the media
may be entrusted with functional obligations. Depending on the media
sector in question, such state interferences are designed differently.
In most Western democracies, governmental interventions in the print
media sector can only be justified if imminent state and societal interests
need to be preserved. As experience shows, society’s interests are not
static; quite to the contrary, they shift over time. Due to the changing
societal risks, different interests constantly need to be balanced. Overall,
however, a legal and factual “guarantee” for a free print media sector is
a constituting element of democratic structures.
Functional obligations of the media have been imposed particularly
in the broadcasting market, as repeatedly emphasized and confirmed by
the German Constitutional Court (see BVerfGE 73, 118; BVerfGE 74,
297; BVerfGE 83, 238). Since the potential influence of television pro-
grams on their audience is material, amounting to a type of “fourth state
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power”, legislators tend to aim at protecting the civil society from undue
effects by establishing a “public” enterprise (which may also be a private
entity assuming a public function, such as the example of the Swiss SRG
illustrates) with an assignment to fulfill a certain mandate ensuring the
supply of the population. This mandate is considered to serve the inter-
ests of the civil society (“Leistungsauftrag” according to Art. 93 para. 2
of the Swiss Constitution), constituting an institutional approach to hu-
man rights. In return for these services, such broadcast enterprises re-
ceive the recipients’ charges as a secured source of income, while the
private broadcasting enterprises have to look for financing sources in
the advertising markets. Such institutional functions of the public broad-
casting entity have been emphasized particularly by the German Consti-
tutional Court, which established the model of a “dual” broadcasting
system (“duale Rundfunkordnung”) (BVerfGE 73, 118; Weber, 2007a:
4157). The implementation of governmentally stated yardsticks, for
example to contribute to the education of the civil society, to acknow-
ledge the cultural identity of the citizens, and to take into account dif-
ferent regions (populations) of a country, however, affect the television
enterprises’ freedom to choose the program topics at their own discre-
tion.
Further governmental interventions may aim at the guarantee of hu-
man rights for the whole society, since granting extensive freedoms in
favor of individual entrepreneurs could endanger the freedoms of other
members of society. State interferences are then justified by the intention
to provide for a democratic order to secure a diversity of voices and
opinions.
Media and the perspective of the fourth power
Tensions between autonomy and influence
Considered as a “fourth power” in democratic states, media are granted
autonomy guarantees to ensure that media enterprises can produce pro-
grams that are not influenced by any governmental agencies or societal
groups. While autonomy is undisputed for print media, it raises more
questions in the field of broadcast:
Often linked to the acknowledgment of media’s autonomy is the
requirement to comply with a large number of quality provisions: Most
constitutions request that facts and information presented in television
programs must be true and correct from a quality point of view and that
the programs support the public’s opinion formation. Personal judg-
ments and evaluations are to be made transparent in order to indicate
that the respective statements are not to be considered as facts. The
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requirement of true and fair information goes much further than, for
example, requirements introduced by civil law in the context of the pro-
tection of personality. According to the legislator’s perception, the po-
tential influence of television programs on the civil society are so sub-
stantial that a rigid qualitative framework is justified. However, to a
certain extent, the European Court on Human Rights has mitigated too
far reaching qualitative requirements, holding that only mandatory
interests of a state can justify proportionate interferences (Monnet c.
Suisse, No. 73604/01, September 21, 2006).
Another constraint concerns the diversity of opinions and information
emitted in television programs. This requirement attempts to address
cultural diversity of content, in particular in countries with different lan-
guages, varied geographical areas, or diverse populations. As in the case
of truthfulness and fairness of information, the diversity approach can
be a desirable ideal, however, such provisions may result in binding re-
strictions for the media makers.
As these examples show, qualitative requirements generally conflict
with the principles of independence and autonomy of broadcast enter-
prises. Experience from the past and from a number of less developed
countries show that a governmental attempt to influence television pro-
grams can have detrimental effects. Legal provisions obliging broadcast
enterprises to act in a specific way jeopardize their autonomy to a certain
extent. Moreover, no substantial evidence is available documenting that
content regulation clearly improves program quality.
Institutional approaches try to establish inputs for solving such ten-
sions. Switzerland, for example, follows a decentralized, federal system
in the organization of its public service broadcast provider in order to
ensure the representation of its cultural diversity within its institutions.
The national enterprise consists of four regional associations, designed
to reflect the four linguistically different geographical Swiss areas (We-
ber, 2007b: 36). The German Constitution entrusts the “Länder” with
the regulation of broadcast. Furthermore, public participation is en-
hanced within the public broadcasting enterprises by the pluralistic em-
bodiment of their executive committees, which attempt to represent the
German society. This framing of broadcasting enterprises’ organizational
structures is no coincidence; it is a direct consequence of Germany’s
experience in the 1930s. Independent public institutions and the pluralis-
tic members of the executive committees are requested to particularly
avoid (1) governmental and private influence beyond a democratically
admitted degree (Palzer, 2007: 43, 48, 5051) as well as (2) media con-
centration in order to protect the diversity and quality of broadcasting
programs. However, if legislators try to avoid developments of media
concentration by governmental oversight, broadcasting enterprises’ au-
tonomy is affected (Meier, 2007: 9097).
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Tensions between individual rights and governmental monitoring
(compliance and surveillance)
In most democratic countries, television enterprises are bound by a more
or less strict compliance and surveillance regime: The government con-
trols the television enterprises’ compliance with the applicable regula-
tions, not only in terms of programming, but also with regard to adver-
tisements and sponsoring. Violations of such rules have legal conse-
quences: For example, monetary fines may be incurred or, in severe
cases, the broadcasting license may be revoked.
Governmental supervision is common in most democratic countries.
This kind of supervision is justified in cases of so-called “public” televi-
sion enterprises that are mandated to offer public service, but also have
the advantage of being financed by license fees. Since the media recipi-
ents pay these charges, the governmental agencies ensure that the sup-
ported broadcasters use their financial resources in an appropriate and
efficient manner.
Program surveillance is an accepted tool in democratic societies, the
basic principles of human rights allowing individuals to express their
opinions within the given framework of the protection of personality
notwithstanding. Due to the fact that judges are not necessarily the best
“evaluators” of programs, mediation agencies are often established to
help reach a compromise between the television enterprise and the con-
cerned persons. Such mediators do not however have the competence to
render judicial decisions; the legislative objective must rather be seen in
the hope that the legal dispute can be settled beforehand. Only if the
mediation is unsuccessful can a claim be filed with a court. Overall, it is
expected that the courts’ monitoring function has a factual influence
on the media makers’ preparation of broadcasting programs, for legal
procedures are expensive and impact reputation.
Conclusion
The media as technical means of information dispersion play an essential
role for democracy. A core task of the media consists of enabling com-
munication and contributing to the formation of the public opinion, a
vital prerequisite for the functioning of democracy. Despite the impor-
tance of the issue, there is no unique legislative model addressing media
and democracy as such. Furthermore, there is no general agreement on
the applicable notion of democracy at the global level, since international
agreements cannot impose a “correct” form of government on sovereign
states. In order to overcome this stumbling block, an agreement should
first be reached on the underlying favored principles.
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At the international level, media and democracy are perceived through
the lens of human rights, focusing on international oversight on the ob-
servance of the right to freedom of opinion and expression within the
different states. Furthermore, the issues of global information and com-
munication have been addressed by the umbrella term “information soci-
ety,” following discussions at the two WSIS in Geneva and Tunis. Their
outcomes have emphasized the human rights approaches and the prin-
ciple of a free flow of information. However, in light of the “digital
divide,” reaching global information in terms of a “world democracy”
seems to be a very ambitious objective. Therefore, the relatively loose
international framework, based on soft law and non-binding declara-
tions, does not grant many stable rights to media makers and it cannot
implement democratic structures for civil society in terms of a legal man-
date. Possibilities for democratic participation and governance as well as
democratic processes on the international stage need further elaboration
followed by practical implementation.
The different national regulations provide for a more specific legal
framework regarding particular aspects of the relationship between me-
dia and democracy. (1) In order to ensure a certain quality of the infor-
mation necessary for the forming of opinion through broadcast, for ex-
ample, legislation stipulates specific guidelines for the content of the
broadcasting program. Such qualitative requirements must be duly bal-
anced with the principles of independence and autonomy of the media
as a fourth state power. (2) The organizational structure of media enter-
prises should not be underestimated when addressing the enhancement
of democratic aspects. A decentralized system can be reflected in the
organization of the public service broadcast providers in order to meet
the requirements regarding cultural diversity issues. Moreover, undue
influence of both governments and private actors should be avoided and
an independent review system applied in favor of a democratic system.
In conclusion, in order to harmonize the regulatory system applicable
for all regulatory tiers, further core issues should be addressed at the
international level, with the aim of enhancing a comprehensive legal
framework for media and democracy.
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